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Abstract—In today’s blockchain system, designing a secure and
high throughput on par with centralized payment system is a
difficulty task. Sharding is one of the most worth expecting tech-
nologies to improve the system throughput when maintain high
security level. However, the previous works have two main limi-
tations: Firstly, the throughput of their random-based sharding
system is not high enough due to not leveraging the heterogeneity
among validators. Secondly, the incentive mechanism can be a
huge overhead on their system without an appropriate scheme.
We propose RepChain, a reputation-based secure, high incentive
and fast blockchain system via sharding. RepChain utilizes
reputation to explicitly characterize the heterogeneity among the
validators and lay the foundation for the incentive mechanism.
We novelly propose the double-chain architecture that including
transaction chain and reputation chain. For transaction chain,
a Raft-based Byzantine fault tolerant synchronous consensus
with high resiliency and high throughput has been presented.
For reputation chain, the collective signing has been utilized
to achieve consensus on the reputation score and support the
high throughput transaction chain with moderate generation
speed. Moreover, we propose a reputation based sharding and
leader selection scheme. To analyze the security of RepChain, we
propose a recursive formula to calculate the epoch security within
only O(km2) time. Further more, we implement and evaluate
RepChain on Amazon Web Service platform. The results show
our solution can enhance both throughout and security level of
the existing sharding-based blockchain system.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Reputation, Sharding
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, blockchain technology has shown great po-
tential to revolutionize the global financial ecosystem [1], [2].
Technically, blockchain is a decentralized and public digital
ledger which records data in a large number of distributed
nodes. In ideal cases of such intermediary-free system, con-
sensus, i.e. agreement on data is expected to be achieved by the
honest majority efficiently (i.e., high throughput) and resistant
to retroactive modification by malicious users (i.e., high secu-
rity). Existing blockchain systems are still far from meeting
above expectations. For example, Bitcoin and Ethereum can
only handle 7 and 20 transactions per second respectively [3],
while their centralized counterparts, PayPal and Visa can deal
with hundreds to thousands of transactions per second [4].
The fundamental limitation is attributed to global consensus
requirement, i.e., every data should be validated by all valida-
tors. Thus, the validation workload increases with the growing
number of the validators, but the system capacity remains
unchanged. Based on above analysis, sharding is an intuitive
solution for throughput improvement, where the validators
are separated into several groups so that transactions can be
processed in parallel. In the state-of-the-art literature, several
sharding-based protocols including RSCoin [5], Elastico [6],
OmniLedger [7] and RapidChain [8] have been proposed to
address the trade-off between throughput and security.
However, most existing sharding systems ignored the fol-
lowing important aspects of a practical blockchain system.
Firstly, they did not consider the heterogeneity among val-
idators. Except distinction on honest/malicious attributes, the
validators are regarded as the same. However, validators in
a practical blockchain system present much difference in
terms of computing capability, communication bandwidth and
historic behaviors. Thus, when applying random sharding [5]–
[7] or simple balanced random sharding [8] in practical
system, those less-competent validators become bottlenecks
and hamper system throughput. Secondly, their protocols lack
proper incentive mechanisms for validator activation and re-
tention. They simply allocate rewards to the shard leaders [6]
or even don’t mention reward allocation [7], [8]. A trivial
incentive mechanism in the PBFT-based protocol is to reward
the validators for their liveness. However, this method requires
an appropriate behavior monitor scheme and extra rounds of
PBFT to forge agreement on this liveness condition, which
brings huge overhead. RScoin [5] allocates rewards to the
active users with the help of a trustable node, the central bank,
which is unrealistic in most blockchain system.
In this paper, we propose reputation concept in the context
of sharding-based system to jointly address the above two
issues in practical systems. Reputation established on the his-
torical behaviors is the cornerstone of many trust systems. For
example, merchants in the markets build up their reputations
on long-term fair trading to earn trust from customers [9],
[10]; nodes in Peer-to-Peer systems establish their reputations
on active participation in file sharing to obtain other nodes’
cooperation [11], [12]. Inspired by above observations, we
design RepChain, a reputation-based high throughput, secure
and high incentive blockchain system, where the reputation
scores of validators are measured based on their behaviours.
The reputation scores are good indicators of validators’
capability and reliability, and also facilitate the design of
incentive mechanism, which is beneficial to sharding systems
in many aspects. In terms of throughput, the shard leader
selection can utilize reputation scores to elect a high capability
leader with higher possibility to boost system throughput.
In terms of incentive, reputation-based reward scheme can
greatly incent the validators to do their best, i.e., an honest and
competent validator deserves more rewards for its contribution
to the system. In addition, reputation scores can enhance
the system security. Reputation-based sharding and leader
selection scheme can balance the total reputation score across
different shards, so that each shard has similar proportions of
active, inactive, honest and malicious validators. Thus, it is
more difficult for the malicious users to take control of one
shard. Generally, reputation-based sharding system is more
secure than random-based ones. It only degrades to a random-
based one with an advanced attacker in the worst case.
To achieve the desired system, two aspects of challenges
as follows should be addressed. Firstly, we should design an
efficient consensus protocol for transactions, which explicitly
consider heterogeneity among the validators, to avoid that the
validators with lower processing capability and more security
breaches become the bottleneck. Secondly, we should design
an efficient consensus protocol for reputation scores. On one
hand, all the validators should calculate and reach a consensus
about the reputation scores to incent the honest and competent
validators and also secure the system. On the other hand,
the reputation scoring should occur at a moderate frequency
without bringing too much overhead to the system.
Thus, RepChain novelly proposes the double-chain archi-
tecture to address above challenges. Specifically, RepChain
maintains transaction chain and reputation chain separately.
Firstly, for transaction chain, RepChain revises and amends
the traditional Raft algorithm to a Byzantine fault tolerant syn-
chronous consensus protocol for sharding-based blockchain,
which achieves transactions agreement efficiently and securely.
Compared with other works, our scheme eases the workload of
the least capable validator to improve the system performance
by incenting competent shard leader to contribute more. An
honest and competent validator has more chance to be selected
as a shard leader, and the reputation-based scheme will ensure
that being honest is its best strategy. Secondly, RepChain pro-
poses a new reputation chain to monitor validators’ behaviour
and achieve consensus on reputation scores efficiently. Besides
the hashes of multiple confirmed transaction blocks and the
reputation scores of all validators, a reputation block also
includes a signature generated via collective signing [13]. One
signature in a reputation block provides authenticity proof for
multiple transaction blocks between last reputation block and
the current one. Such compression enables a reputation chain
with moderate generation speed to support a high through-
put transaction chain. It is worth mentioning that existing
sharding-based systems can also benefit from our core idea
that leveraging the reputation chain with moderate generation
speed to support the high throughput transaction chain. With
a little modification on their consensus and sharding scheme,
the incentive and security property can be both enhanced.
To evaluate RepChain, we analyze the security, the perfor-
mance and the incentive mechanism of RepChain. Different
from previous works [7], [8] that only estimated the failure
probability of one epoch, we propose a new recursive formula
to give the exact solution in time complexity of O(km2). Fur-
thermore, we implement RepChain and test it under Amazon
Web Service with 900 instances of which 450 are from US
West and 450 are from US East. It is different from Elastico
that put all the instances in US West or Omniledger and
RapidChain that put all the nodes in one local area where the
latency is controlled well. The 900 instances simulate 1800
nodes and the shard size is 225 to maintain a high security
level. The result shows our system achieves the throughput
of 6852 transactions per second (tps) and the user-perceived
latency of 58.2 seconds in average. We also test RepChain
under three different threat models and different validator
capabilities. The results present RepChain can enhance the
throughput and security level of sharding-based blockchain
system by leveraging reputation scores.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
1) RepChain is the first to utilize reputation scores in
sharding-based system, which explicitly characterize the
heterogeneity among the validators and lay the foundation
for the incentive mechanism.
2) RepChain is the first sharding-based system with double-
chain architecture which enable a reputation chain with
moderate generation speed to support a high throughput
transaction chain.
3) We propose a Raft-based Byzantine fault tolerant syn-
chronous consensus for transaction chain to achieve high
throughput and high resiliency.
4) We propose the reputation-based sharding and leader
selection scheme to boost the system throughput and
enhance its security.
5) We propose a recursive formula to analyze the epoch
security precisely in time complexity of O(km2).
6) We implement the proposed system and conduct extensive
evaluations on Amazon Web Service to validate the
effectiveness of our design.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we introduce the blockchain scalability
problem, the related sharding-based blockchain systems and
the reputation-based system.
A. Blockchain Scalability
It is well known that scalability is an unsolved issue in the
existing blockchain systems. In the state-of-the-art literature,
Bitcoin-NG [14] boosts system throughput by allowing the
shard leaders in an epoch to append more blocks than those
of Bitcoin. However, the computation overhead of each node
also increases substantially with the boosted throughput. Byz-
Coin [13] leverages a collective signing technique to reduce
communication complexity of PBFT, but it does not make
fundamental changes on PBFT to solve the scalability issue.
Lightning network [15] and Bolt [16] both utilize the off-
chain payment to deal with scalability. Lightning network [15]
allows the participants to transfer micro-payments through a
payment channel without appending it onto the main chain.
Bolt [16] implements a privacy-preserving payment chan-
nel with zero-knowledge proofs. As an enhancement to the
main chain, the off-chain solutions could increase the system
throughput significantly. However, the off-chains generally do
not have the same security guarantees as the main chain, which
results in vulnerability to various attacks [17], [18].
B. Sharding-based Blockchain
A sharding-based blockchain could have higher throughput
with more validators in the network. By distributing the
transactions to different shards, the total throughput is equal
to the product of the in-shard throughput and the number of
shards. According to the literature, several high throughput and
secure systems have been proposed. RSCoin [5] implemented
a centrally banked system via sharding. A simple Two Phase
Commit (2PC) has been utilized between the user and a set
of mintettes from one shard. Elastico [6] proposed the first
sharding-based consensus protocol for public blockchain. They
Fig. 1. RepChain Overview Fig. 2. Data structure of TxList, TxDec and TxDecSet
achieved a near-linear computational scalability which can
tolerates 1/4 fraction of corruptions among all the nodes. In
their system, PoW was adopted to establish the identities of
the validators, and BFT protocol was used within the shard.
OmniLedger [7] shards and selects a leader via a verifiable
random function (VRF). A variant of ByzCoin [13] has been
used to improve the throughput. RapidChain [8] improves
the throughput and achieves a total resiliency to a 1/3 of
corruptions from all nodes via a synchronous protocol.
In terms of incentive mechanism, RSCoin implemented an
incentive mechanism with the help of a central bank, which is
unrealistic in most blockchain systems. The remaining three
works [6]–[8] do not consider the incentive mechanism. Also
for all the members to monitor the behaviours of each other
and to reacha a consensus on these behaviours will incur
extra overheads. Compared with them, our reputation scheme
rewards validators based on their behaviours. Considering
the throughput, these works do not consider the capability
differences between validators and thus the performance is the
average of all the validators. Our system adopts the double-
chain architecture which generates the reputation block at a
moderate speed without too much overhead to record the repu-
tation of all the validators. Also the reputation leader selection
will elect a high capability leader with higher possibility. The
raft-based consensus ultlizes the high capability to improve
the throughput. From the security aspect, almost all these
systems are based on random sharding and leader selection of
which the security level is lower than the reputation-based one.
RepChain only degrades to the random-based one in the worst
case where an advanced attacker firstly observes the reputation
distribution of all validators, and then acts with the same
probability as the distribution. Moreover RapidChain proposed
to separate the active and inactive validators, and balance their
proportions among the groups. Their classification method
is quite coarse which simply regards half of the validators
as active nodes and the remaining half as inactive nodes.
Moreover, the classification is determined by the reference
committee generated at the very beginning, which could result
in security problems without a proper update scheme for the
reference committee.
C. Reputaion and Blockchain
In traditional P2P network, it is common to leverage rep-
utation as an incentive mechanism [11], [12]. In the state-
of-the-art literature in the blockchain area, CertChain [19]
proposed a Dependability-rank based consensus as well as
an incentive mechanism that takes the economic benefits
and misbehavior into consideration. However, their design is
tailored for the certifying authorities (CA) but not for the
scalability issue. RepuCoin [20], a non peer-reviewed work,
tried to use reputation in the blockchain. They measured the
reputation of the users based on their behaviours, and proposed
a reputation-based weighting scheme consensus to overcome
the computation cost in PoW. However, there are some critical
defects in their system: (1) RepuCoin used a committee-
based consensus that only rewards the keyblock miner and the
consensus group, which leads to an unstable income for the
participants. (2) Their reputation scores are based on the total
amount of valid work over time. The cumulative reputation
scores together with the committee-based consensus could
result in a severe monopoly problem and double spending
attacks if the high reputation users collude with each other.
Moreover, it is difficult for the new validators to join the
consensus group and get the reward. (3) Their system could be
defeated if an attacker joins the system in the very beginning.
III. MODEL AND OVERVIEW
This section introduces the notations, network model, threat
model and the overview of RepChain respectively.
A. Notation
We assume there are n validators V n = {v1, v2, ..., vn} and
k shards denoted as Ck = {C1, C2, ..., Ck}. Thus, there are
m = n/k validators in each shard, including one leader and
m− 1 members. The reputation score of each validator is ri.
tx denotes a transaction. Each epoch e has a fixed time and
each step in the consensus is finished within the time ∆.
B. Network Model
Our network model is similar to those in the existing
works [6]–[8]. Specifically, it is assumed that the connections
between honest nodes are well established, and the transmis-
sion between them is within∆. The communication channel is
synchronous within one shard, as we adopted the synchronous
consensus. Traditionally, the drawback of such a consensus is
poor responsiveness [8]. However, we adopt the method from
RapidChain [8], where all the members would agree on a new
∆ every week to achieve a long-term responsiveness. The other
parts of RepChain are based on partially-synchronous channels
with optimistic exponentially increasing time-outs.
C. Threat Model
In our protocol, we assume a Byzantine adversary who
corrupts less than g = n/3 nodes. The corrupted nodes can
collude with each other act out arbitrary behaviours such as
sending invalid information or remaining silent. It is assumed
that the adversary corrupts the fixed part of the nodes, which
is different from the roundly adaptive attackers in [6]–[8].
In reality, validators rarely have the same capabilities and
secure protection, i.e., some nodes are easily corrupted while
others are more robust. Besides, our system only kicks out a
node when it misbehaves as the shard leader. Thus, for the
adversary’s benefit, it is more realistic to control a fixed part
of corrupted nodes to pretend to be good nodes until they get
high reputations or even are selected as shard leaders, then
suddenly launch an attack to the system. Therefore, this paper
considers three attacker strategies as follows.
Simple Attack: The attacker does bad things continuously.
Camouflage Attack: The malicious node pretends to be a
normal node until it becomes a shard leader. The malicious
nodes within the shard will support the malicious leader.
Observe-Act Attack: The attacker observes the reputation
score distribution of the normal users. Then the attacker con-
trols the malicious nodes to act and have the same reputation
score distribution as the normal one. It indicates that the
malicious nodes would have higher chances to be grouped
into the same shard according to the sharding algorithm.
D. System Overview
Our system is built on double-chain architecture – a trans-
action chain and a reputation chain. It mainly has four
components as Fig. 1 shows: sharding and leader selection,
Raft-based synchronous consensus, reputation scheme, and
synchronization .
Sharding and Leader Selection: All the nodes are sharded
into different groups at the beginning of each epoch. Then
each shard selects its shard leader.
Raft-based Synchronous Consensus: The clients send their
txs to the shards which are responsible for the input UTXOs
(unspent transaction output). Then the shard runs an intra-
shard Raft-based synchronous consensus to generate both
the transaction blockchain at high speed and the reputation
blockchain at moderate speed. Moreover, the system adopts
an atomic cross-shard protocol for cross-shard transactions.
Reputation Scheme: The reputation scheme enhances the
previous two components. Given the behaviour of all validators
by the consensus, all validators can calculate and reach a
consensus on the reputation scores. The cumulative reputation
scores support better sharding and leader selection. As a result,
all three components guarantee a secure, high-incentive and
fast blockchain.
Synchronization: At the end of the epoch, each shard gener-
ates a state block to conclude the transaction blockchain and
the reputation blockchain. The nodes synchronize and update
the stored reputation scores based on the state blocks from all
the shards, and then the system begins the next epoch.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN
This section presents the detailed design of RepChain.
A. Sharding and Leader Selection
In sharding and leader selection, our system maintains four
properties as follows:
• Randomness: It is hard to predict the results of the
sharding and leader selection.
• Balance: Each shard has the similar total reputation score,
i.e., similar proportions of active and inactive and honest
and malicious validators. It is difficult for malicious users
to take control of one shard.
• Uniformity: The results can be validated by each validator
locally without too much communication overhead.
• Incentive: For the validators, the higher the reputation,
the higher the probability of being selected as the shard
leader.
More specifically, when a new epoch e begins, all the
validators will be sharded into different groups. For each
group, a shard leader will be selected based on their cumulative
reputation score Rw over previous w epochs as Alg. 1 shows.
Specifically, the validators use previous state block hashes
from all the shards to generate the random generator RNG
(Line 2 in Alg. 1, SBHe−1i denotes the hash of shard i’s state
block at epoch e−1). Rsort denotes the validators’ reputation
scores sorted in descending order(Line 3). Next, each validator
is randomly assigned to a shard of minimum size to maintain
the balance property(Line 4-7). For shard leader selection,
we adopt the following strategy to maintain the incentive,
randomness and uniformity property simultaneously. First, the
validators with reputation scores higher than the median have
chances of being selected as the leader. Each score of these
validators will divide a number that is randomly generated
based on the same seed Seede, then the validator with the
minimum result is selected as the leader. (Line 11-17)
Algorithm 1 Sharding and Leader Selection Algorithm
Input:
A random Seede = {SBHe−11 , SBH
e−1
2 , ..., SBH
e−1
k };
The cumulative reputation score Rw = {rw1 , r
w
2 , ..., r
w
n }
over previous w epochs;
Output:
The k shards C = {C1, C2, ..., Ck};
The k leaders L = {l1, l2, ..., lk}.
1: Initialize Ci = ∅, Li = ∅ for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
2: Set the seed of random generator RNG as Seede.
3: Rsort = sort(Rw)
4: for each rsorti in R
sort (rSorti is validator vg’s score) do
5: Find a sequence {t1, t2, ..., tj} which makes the subset
{Ct1 , Ct2 , ..., Ctj} of C satisfies |Ct1 | = |Ct2 | = ... =
|Ctj | = min(|C1|, |C2|, ..., |Ck|).
6: Generate a random integer x from RNG.
7: Assign validator vg to Ctu that u = x mod j.
8: end for
9: for each shard Ci ∈ C do
10: rm = median of the subset of Rw that belongs to Ci
11: for each validator vj ∈ Ci do
12: if rm ≤ rwj then
13: Generate a random float 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 from RNG.
14: pi,j = y/r
w
j
15: else
16: pi,j = +∞
17: end if
18: end for
19: li = vj where pi,j = min(pi,1, pi,2, ...pi,m)
20: end for
B. Consensus
Inspired by Raft [21], XFT [22] and the protocol proposed
by Ren et al. [23] and RapidChain [8], we propose a Raft-
based synchronous consensus to achieve high throughput and
1/2 resilience within a shard. Our consensus constructs two
blockchains in each shard: the transaction blockchain and
the reputation blockchain. The transaction blockchain includes
all the transaction txs that belong to the shard, while the
reputation blockchain includes the reputation scores that all
the validators earned in this epoch.
Similar to Bitcoin, each transaction tx will have a unique
identity, a list of input UTXOs and a list of output UTXOs.
UTXO, short for unspent transaction output, is the unused coin
from previous tx and contains the signature. All the clients
will send their transactions to the shards responsible for the
input UTXOs and output UTXOs listed in these transactions.
The shard i will validate the tx if its ID mod k is equal to i.
The input UTXOs may come from different shards. Thus, our
system should handle both intra-shard consensus and cross-
shard transactions. We denote the shard be responsible for the
input UTXO as the input shard, and the shard for the output
UTXO as the output shard.
1) Intra-Shard Consensus: The intra-shard consensus
mainly contains five synchronous steps. The related data
structures are shown in Fig. 2. TxList refers to the transaction
list including the transaction hashes in ascending order and the
signature of the leader. TxDec refers to transaction decisions
given by the member, which contains the decisions in the
same order as the TxList and the signature. TxDecSet refers
to the transaction decision set including all the TxDecs from
shard members. Before the consensus protocol, the leaders will
gather the transactions and broadcast them to all the validators.
Thus, the validators can do a consensus on the TxList to reduce
the bandwidth cost. We also remark that all the messages
will be signed by the sender with their public key during the
consensus so that the sender and the integrity of the message
can be verified.
Firstly, the leader signs and sends a transaction list (TxList),
which contains a list of transactions’ IDs to all shard members.
Then each validator checks all the transactions in the TxList
and makes a decision, Yes, No or Unknown. Unknown is
given to avoid punishment on reputation score when it cannot
handle so many transactions due to the hardware limitations.
Secondly, the validators sign and send the decisions (TxDec)
in which the txs are ordered the same as the TxList back
to the leader. After the leader collects all the TxDec within
the shard, it will generate a transaction block (TB) including
the transactions with more than half of Yes. Thirdly, the leader
sends the TB as well as the transaction decision set (TxDecSet)
including all the validators’ TxDecs to all shard members.
Fourthly, each validator checks the TxDecSet and the TB from
the leader. If the leader does any of the bad things described
in Sec. V-B, the honest validators will send Warning with its
signature to each other. When half of the validators send out
Warning, the honest validators can begin rolling: kicking out
the current leader, dropping the current incorrect transaction
block, clearing the cumulative reputation score of the leader,
and reselecting a leader. The consensus above indicate the
transaction block has been confirmed within the shard.
The fifth step is for reputation chain. After the generation
of several transaction blocks without warning, the validators
can calculate the reputation scores to generate the Reputation
Block (RB) based on the TxDecSet and the TB, and achieve a
consensus via Collective Signing. Specifically, the leader and
the validators run two sequential rounds including announce-
ment and commitment, challenge, and response to sign on the
messages in RB. The RB contains the reputation scores of all
the validators and the TB hash.
The intra-shard consensus separates the confirmation of the
transaction validation within and out of the shard to reduce
the bandwidth cost. If no Warning is received, the consensus
on the TB has been achieved by all the validators within the
shard. Besides, a validator can send TxList and TxDecSet to
prove whether a tx is valid or not to the client. However, it
will cost a lot of bandwidth to transmit the TxDecSet that
contains the signatures from all the validators. Moreover, the
cross-shard transaction makes the condition worse, because all
input shards should send such proof to the client. To reduce
the bandwidth cost, we adopt the collective signing [13] in
which the amount of signatures will only be 1/m of those in
the TxDecSet. Thus, only the output shard needs to transmit
one RB with a collective signature to the client as a proof.
2) Cross-Shard Transactions: Omniledger [7] introduces
the Byzantine Shard Atomic Commit (Atomix) protocol that
supports secure cross-shard transactions. We propose an en-
hanced protocol to overcome two drawbacks of their protocol:
(1) Atomix requires the client to be active to help the input
shards send the proof-of-acceptance to the output shards.
Such a requirement can be satisfied in reality because the
client may be offline. (2) For each tx, the client should send
one proof-of acceptance to the output shard which costs lots
of bandwidth. Also, it brings more communication overhead
on the client. In RapdiChain [8], they propose to batch the
transactions and separate the multiple input UTXOs of cross-
shard transactions. For each cross-shard txa, the output shard
will generate multiple transactions that only has one input
UTXO and one output UTXO of the current shard. The input
UTXO corresponds to one of the input shards of txa. However,
their method creates more transactions so that the transaction
blocks become larger. To overcome these disadvantages, we
combine their method and propose a new cross-shard protocol.
In RepChain, the input shard leader sends the TxList and
TxDecSet to the relevant input and output shards’ leaders.
Then the leader distributes the TxList and TxDecSet to all
the validators within the shard. It is worth mentioning that
the TxDec from validators contains multiple signatures and
each will be used to sign one subset of the TxList. The txs
in one subset are sent to the same output shard to reduce
the bandwidth cost. For a specific cross-shard tx, the shard
will accept if its UTXOs are not used or locked otherwise
the tx will be rejected. Then both the input and output shards
will lock it and its UTXOs. When the output shard receives
the proof of accept - TxDecSets containing the input UTXOs
from all the relevant input shards, it adds the tx onto their TB.
When the input shard receives the proof of accept from other
relevant input shards, it will release the tx and its UTXO. If
one of the input shards rejects the tx, then the relevant input
and output shards will abort the tx.
3) Optimization with Parallelizing: To enhance the
throughput of RepChain, we adopt parallelizing similar to
Omniledger, i.e., the transactions would be handled in different
blocks in parallel if they do not conflict with each other.
More specifically, each TxList, TxDecSet, and TB include an
iteration number to indicate the round. The leader can send
a new TxList once it receives all TxDecs of previous rounds
from the validators. Recalling that our consensus protocol is a
synchronous one, it guarantees that before receiving the TxList
of the current round, the honest majority have finished the job
of sending the TxDec of the previous round to the leader. Thus
the validators can determine whether the new TxList is valid
or not.
Fig. 3. This figure shows the structure of the reputation block (RB) and
state block (SB) as well as the working procedure of colective signing in the
synchronization process.
C. Reputation Scheme
Recalling that we use double-chain architecture, previous
section explained the generation of the transaction chain in
detail. In this section, we illustrate the design of the reputation
scheme which includes the calculation of the reputation score
and the generation of the reputation blockchain. Our proposed
reputation scheme can enhance the security, incentive property
and throughput of RepChain.
1) Reputation Score Calculation: At the end of one intra-
shard consensus, the reputation scores within the shard can be
calculated by all shard members individually and uniformly
based on TxDecSet and TB. Inspired by PeerTrust [11], the
reputation score ri of validator i are calculated as follows:
ri =
l∑
j=1
S(j) ∗ T (j)
Where l is the number of transactions generated after the
previous RB. T (j) is the value of transaction j to prevent the
case where some validators are honest on small transactions
but dishonest on a large transaction. The scaling factors S(j)
are used to reward or penalize different behaviours differen-
tially. eBay [24] simply gives a reputation score of {-1, 0,
1} to correct, unknown and incorrect decisions. However, a
validator can still gain a lot of profits even it is dishonest from
time to time. Thus our system sets different scaling factors
for different behaviours to make the punishment for dishonest
behaviours larger than the reward for honest ones. Further-
more, an illegitimate tx being passed is more dangerous than
a legitimate tx being aborted. Thus, if a validator gives a
”Yes” while most of the others give a ”No”, the validator
will be punished more than the situation where it gives a ”No”
while the others gives a ”Yes”. For ”Unknown” decision, the
validators neither earn nor lose their reputation scores, since it
is believed that these validators generally have lower capacities
(CPU, hard disk, and bandwidth etc).
2) Reputation Blockchain: After the reputation score cal-
culation, the validators utilized collective signing to generate
the RB, the structure of which is shown in Fig. 3. RB contains
the reputation score, the confirmed TB list, the previous RB
and the collective signature. It also contains the previous
state blocks from all shards if it is the first block of one
epoch. The collective signature contain the information on the
number and identity of validators who agree on the block.
Other shards can check the collective signature, and accept it
if more than half of the validators sign on the block. Thus,
the user-perceived latency of a transaction is almost the same
as the time interval between two RBs. Within one epoch,
the shard will generate a few of RBs and form a reputation
blockchain. The cumulative reputation scores over the sliding
window on w epochs can easily be calculated via traversing
through the reputation blockchain and used in sharding and
leader selection.
Moreover, the malicious validators can fork the transaction
blockchain and the reputation blockchain. However, as shown
in Fig. 3, if a malicious validator in shard C1 (blue) forks
the blockchain by generating the malicious TBs and RBs, the
shard C2 (green) can easily check the collective signature to
pick the correct blockchain signed by the honest majority.
D. Synchronization
In the sharding system, the transactions are separated into
different shards. Thus at the end of one epoch, the validators
of all shards need to synchronize their reputation blockchain
and transaction blockchain to prepare for the next epoch. To
prevent the huge cost of sending the whole blockchain, the
validators utilize collective signing to generate a state block
(SB). Then the validators use PoW to generate the nonce
in SB, which brings the randomness for sharding and leader
selection in the next epoch.
The structure of SB is shown in Fig. 3. It contains the overall
reputation scores of the validators over the past w epochs and
the UTXO set of the clients by this epoch. The UTXO set is
the set containing all the UTXO that are generated within this
epoch. We also combine the UTXO that belong to one public
key. For example, if two UTXOs have the values of a and
b respectively and both belong to the public key PKx. The
validators will drop the UTXO that has the value of b and adds
the value onto the remaining UTXO. The drop principle is to
reserve the UTXO with the smaller address. Thus, a validator
only needs to download the state block of the other shard
instead of downloading all of the data in TB and RB.
E. Double-Chain Architecture
As we mentioned before, we utilize the double-chain archi-
tecture to enhance security, throughput and incentive mecha-
nism. Previous sections detail all of the parts. In this section,
we put all the pieces together to show how double-chain
architecture works.
The double-chain architecture includes the transaction chain
and the reputation chain. The transaction chain achieves the
consensus within the shard via our intra-shard consensus
protocol at a fast speed to provide a high throughput. The
reputation blockchain is created at a moderate speed to record
the behaviour based on TxDecSet and TB. Since the reputation
block contains the collective signature, it can provide the proof
of accept to the client. Moreover, the reputation blockchain
supports a balanced sharding and leader selection, incents the
validators for working hard and enhances the throughput. As
a result, such a design can provide a secure, fast and high
incentive sharding based blockchain system
V. SYSTEM ANALYSIS
In this section, we will analyze the security, the performance
and the incentive mechanism of RepChain.
A. Epoch Secuirty
For epoch security, previous work [8] only estimates the
upper bound of the failure probability via hypergeometric
distribution since the straightforward calculation for the exact
solution requires O(mk) time. We propose a novel recursive
formula to calculate exact solution in the time complexity of
O(km2), and prove RepChain only degrades to the random-
based sharding scheme in the worst case.
Firstly, we provide the recursive formula for random-based
sharding. We denote F (x, y) as the number of the safe
allocations, where x malicious nodes are assigned to y shards.
An unsafe shard refers that half of the shard members are
malicious nodes. If the above assignment results in any one
unsafe shard, we regard such assignment as a failure, and
the failure probability is P (failure) = 1 − F (g, k)/Cgn. If
the y-th shard contains s malicious nodes, then the original
question is reduced to the number of safe allocations, where
g − s malicious nodes are distributed to y − 1 shards. Thus,
the equation can be calculated recursively as follows:
F (x, y) =
d∑
s=0
F (x − s, y − 1)Csm (1)
where d = ⌊m−12 ⌋ and F (x, 1) = C
x
m1x≤d. For the case
of random-based sharding, given n = 1800 and k = 8,
P (failure) = 1.25553e−07.
Secondly, we prove that the observe-act attack degrades the
security level as well as the performance of RepChain to that
of the random-based sharding. Since the malicious validators
maintain the same reputation score distribution as the honest
nodes, the possibility of a validator being an attacker or a
honest node is independent of the reputation scores. However,
as the calculation above, it is still secure enough.
Thirdly, we prove RepChain is more secure under Cam-
ouflage Attacker than random sharding. Given all malicious
validators support the malicious leader under Camouflage At-
tacker, they expose themselves due to rolling scheme and their
reputation scores will decrease. Their cumulative reputation
score will be lower than honest validators the following w
epochs. Assuming a (a = pk + q, 0 ≤ q ≤ k − 1) malicious
nodes are exposed, they will be allocated into k shard equally
accroding to our sharding scheme. The allocation is equivalent
to distribute g − pk malicious nodes to k shards where each
shard already contains p nodes. For clear elaboration, we first
consider the rest q exposed validators will be assigned to k-th
to (k − q + 1)-th shard. We denote F (x, y, t) as the number
of the safe allocations, where x is the number of malicious
validators except the exposed ones, y denotes the number of
shard and t is the number of exposed malicious nodes. It can
be calculated similar to Equation 1 as follows:
F (x, y, t) =
d−ul∑
s=0
F (x− s, y − 1,max(t− 1, 0))Csm−p−ul
where l = k− y, ul = 1l∈[0,q−1], v = max{0, q− l− 1} and
F (x, 1, 0) = Cxm1x≤d. The above recursive equation can be
calculated within O(km2) time. Since we only consider the
situation that the q validators are assigned to the last q shards,
the total number of safe allocation should be CqkF (g−a, k, q)
and the failure probability is (CqkF (g − a, k, q))/(C
q
kC
g−a
n−a)
when considering all situations. Fig 4 shows the failure
probability with different a. The failure probability decreases
with a increases, i.e., the system are more secure when
more malicious nodes are exposed. Thus, the security level
of RepChain under such attack will be higher than random
sharding scheme. For Simple Attack, the attacker can never
success since the attackers are always exposed to the system.
B. Security of Intra-shard Consensus
In Sec. V-A, we prove that a shard having more than half
of the malicious nodes is almost impossible. Based on this,
we prove the safety and liveness of our intra-shard consensus.
1) Safety of Intra-shard Consensus: For a transaction block,
we first prove a malicious leader cannot construct a malicious
transaction block with a legal TxSecSet. A malicious leader
cannot modify TxDecSet because it contains the signature of
shard members. However, the leader may remove one TxDec
of a certain validator from TxDecSet on purpose. Furthermore,
the malicious leader may add an illegitimate tx without half
of the ”Yes” to TB, drop a legitimate tx on purpose, or
remains silent for a long time and so on. The shard members
will broadcast ”Warning” signals when they find the above
malicious behaviours. Once half of the shard members send
out a ”Warning”, the rolling scheme will be executed to
prevent the malicious leader. The cumulative reputation scores
of the malicious leader would be cleared, thus it will take a
long time and hard work before the malicious node would be
selected as shard leader again. Next, we prove a malicious
member cannot construct a malicious transaction block when
there is an honest leader. Once the honest leader construct a
transaction block, it will be accepted by the honest majority.
No malicious member can construct a safe proposal for another
transaction block because it cannot construct or modify the
TxDecSet with enough ”Yes” as a proof.
For the reputation block, the proof is almost the same as the
transaction block. The only difference is instead of utilizing
TxDecSet as a proof, the collective signature is used.
2) Liveness of Intra-shard Consensus: We use the definition
of liveness as the finality for one block which is the same
as other works [8]. As we mentioned before, the expectation
round for an honest leader is around two in the worst case.
The honest leader will send the valid TxList and since half
of the shard members are honest, the TxDecSet can be given.
Thus all the honest shard members will accept a valid block.
If the current leader is a malicious one who wants to stop the
consensus or other malicious behaviour, the rolling process
will be launched and a new leader will eventually be selected.
Thus a valid block will be proposed by an honest leader and
accepted by the honest majority with a proof - TxDecSet.
Although the proof above is for transaction block, it is also
suitable for reputation block.
C. Security of Cross-shard Transaction
In cross-shard transactions, all shards are honest since
the consensus has been achieved within the shard. Thus we
can come to the following conclusion. Firstly, a cross-shard
transaction tx will eventually be recorded in the block or be
aborted. The input shards give a proof of accept or reject for
the tx. One reject could abort the tx, while all accepts from
the input shards could validate the tx. Otherwise, the input
and output shards lock the tx and its UTXOs. Secondly, the
transaction would not be recorded twice because the shard
responsible for the UTXO will check whether it has been used
or locked. Thirdly, if a transaction is aborted, the client could
reclaim the UTXOs released by the input shards. Fourthly,
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Fig. 7. Throughput scalability
the shard leader may be malicious or crash. In such a case,
the rolling process will be launched and the new leader will
re-check all the tx processed via the previous leader.
D. Performance Analysis
Without loss of generality, we analyze the complexity of
consensus per tx, supposing one tx is processed in RepChain
of shard size m. At first, the client sends the tx to all the
input and output shards. Specifically, the client sends tx to one
validator of each shard, and the validator helps broadcast tx
within the shard, which requires O(m) communication cost.
Next, the shard leader generates a TxList of size b, and broad-
cast both TxList and txs to all shard members. Such a process
brings another communication overhead of O(m). Then, the
leader collects all TxDec which needs O(m/b) complexity
and broadcasts the TxDecSet which needs O(m2/b) time to
all validators to reach an intra-shard consensus. In total, it costs
O(m2/b) time. In addition, if tx is a cross-shard transaction,
the TxDecSet of one shard should also be transmitted to
all related input and output shards. Given the assumption
that the number of inputs and outputs is constant, the total
communication between cross-shards for tx costs O(m2/b).
Therefore, the consensus complexity of one transaction tx is
equal to O(m2/b) for both intra-shard and cross-shard.
It is worth mentioning that the shard leader contributes more
bandwidth and computing resources to generate the TxList,
TxDecSet, and TB than other validators. Different from the
previous work, our scheme explicitly considers capability
difference among the validators. Specifically, the reputation
scheme eases the workload of the least capable validators to
improve the system performance by encouraging the honest
and competent validator to contribute more. These validators
generally have higher computing resources and bandwidth to
process the transactions, thus they will accumulate reputa-
tion scores more quickly than others. In our scheme, these
validators have more chance of being shard leaders. With
more contributions from the more capable shard leaders, the
throughput of the system can be significantly improved.
E. Incentive Mechanism
RepChain provides great incentives, including reputation
scores and money - transaction fees to make sure being honest
is more beneficial to the validators than being dishonest. In
transaction verification, half of the transaction fee is given
to the leader and the rest is allocated to the other validators
based on their reputation scores earned in the current epoch.
Thus, even a newly joined node could earn reputation scores
and get a stable income under our scheme, if it is honest and
works hard. A malicious node may try to cheat the system
by being dishonest occasionally. However, on the one hand,
such a node would obtain fewer reputation scores than the
honest majority, thus it has barely any chance of being a
leader and threatening the system. On the other hand, it also
earns much fewer rewards than others during this process, i.e.,
cheating occasionally is not a good strategy for its own benefit.
Thus, it is believed that a rational node would not adopt being
dishonest. Furthermore, a proper sliding window w is utilized
to make sure the selected leader is the honest node who has
contributed continuously. In the meantime, w should not be
too large to prevent the monopoly. The considerable profit for
being the leader would encourage the validators to stay and
contribute.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we first describe the setup of our system and
then illustrate the detailed evaluation as follows:
1) The performance of RepChain under different settings.
2) The scalability of RepChain
3) The performance under different threat models
4) The throughput enhancement via utilizing the heterogene-
ity among validators.
5) The epoch transition time.
A. Evaluation Setup
We implement RepChain in Go language [25]. For collective
signing, we use the code in Go cryptography libraries [26]. For
the parameters in RepChain, we set the sliding window e to
be 10. The size of the transaction block is 4MB. No more
than a 1/3 fraction of nodes is a malicious node. The scaling
factor of S(j) in reputation score calculation is set to be 0.1
for a correct decision, 0 for Unknown, -0.5 for an incorrect
decision that the transaction should be passed but the validator
decides to give No, and -1 for an incorrect decision that the
transaction should be rejected but the validator decides to give
Yes. To simulate the transactions, each validator will generate
transactions by themselves and send them to each other.
We run all the experiments on the Amazon Web Service.
More specifically, 900 c4.large EC2 instances from two dif-
ferent regions to simulate 1800 nodes. Elastico set all their
instances in the US West, Omniledger and RapidChain set
all their nodes in one location. Different from them, we
set 450 instances in Oregon from the US West and 450
instances in North Virginia from the US East to simulate
a realistic, globally distributed deployment. Each instance is
equipped with 2 Amazon vCPUs and 3.75GB of memory. The
bandwidth is set to be 20Mbps for each node. Every node will
have the same capabilities in most tests except the throughput
enhancement test.
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B. Performance
In this evaluation, we test the performance under different
shard sizes of RepChain. The metrics of performance com-
prises two parts: throughput and user-perceived latency. The
definition of these two metrics are the same as other works
[6]–[8]. The throughput is the number of transactions the
system processes in one second. The user-perceived latency
is the time that a user sends a tx to the network until the
time that tx can be confirmed by any (honest) node in the
system [8]. In our case, it is the time when a transaction is
proposed until the RB is built so that any user can validate the
transaction. More specifically, the system is tested under the
simple attack with three different shard sizes: 100, 225, 300
and 450. The average throughput and user-perceived latency
have been measured and shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. The
throughput for the four shard sizes is 15421 tps, 6853 tps,
4288 tps and 1485 tps respectively. The user-perceived latency
is 20.4s, 58.2s, 88.5s and 146.0s. With the increase in sharding
size, the throughput will decrease and the latency will increase.
The poor performance under the shard size of 600 is due to
the following reasons. First, RepChain shifts some workload
from the members to the leader. With the larger shard size, the
bandwidth of the leader for package transmission will increase
a lot. Second, the transaction needs to be sent to one other after
it is generated which also costs lots of time. Anyway, when
satisfying the security property, the shard size of 225 has a
larger throughput than other previous works. The latency is
almost equal to Omniledger. This indicates our design really
can support a high-throughput transaction chain.
C. Scalability
In this section, we test the scalability of RepChain. The
evaluation measure RepChain’s throughput based on the shard
size of 225 with different numbers of nodes: 450, 900, 1350
and 1800. For each setting, half of the nodes are set in the
US West and the remaining half are set in the US East. The
result is presented in Fig. 7. The throughput is 1834 tps, 3610
tps, 5333 tps and 6853 tps. With more nodes, the throughput
increases linearly. The result indicates the system can be scaled
up with more computation power joining the system.
D. Security
In this section, we test three different attack models: Simple
Attack, Camouflage Attack and Observe-Act Attack with 1800
nodes and a shard size of 225. The throughput is measured
and shown in Fig. 8. The first two attacks can be implemented
easily. However, the performance under Observe-Act Attack
depends on the ability of the attacker. Thus we test our
system with a very strong attacker that can observe the score
distribution of all the validators. In other words, we cannot
distinguish the attackers and honest validators based on their
reputation scores. For the Simple Attack, our system runs
poorly for first two epochs, but all the attackers will have a
lower reputation after the third epoch so that they can barely
degrade the performance of RepChain. For the Camouflage
Attack, the throughput of RepChain is around 6000 tps. Once
the leader is a malicious node, the rolling scheme will be
launched and its reputation score will be cleared. Thus, the
malicious node needs a long time (around 10 epochs) to gain
enough reputation score and be selected as a leader again.
Based on this, the system can still perform well. For the
Observe-Act Attack, the throughput is around 5500 tps which is
worse than the previous two attack models. As we mentioned
in Sec. V-A, such an attacker will cause the RepChain to
the same as the random sharding system. In other words,
the possibility of a malicious leader is always around 1/3
every epoch. From the results and analysis in Sec. V-A, we
can conclude that the RepChain can enhance the performance
and security level when facing Simple Attack and Camouflage
Attack and is the same level as the random sharding scheme
under Observe-Act Attack.
E. Throughput Enhancement
In this section, we illustrate that the reputation scheme can
provide the benefit in throughput enhancement mentioned in
Sec. V-D. We set different validators with different capabilities
and test whether the reputation scores are relevant to their
capabilities. Specifically, we define the capability of the node
in Sec. VI-B as 100% and limit the speed of handling trans-
actions of the validators so that a low capability validator will
give more Unknon responses than a high capability validator.
In this setting, we set k = 8 and n = 1800. Moreover,
all the validators are honest for controlling the variables and
their capabilities follow the uniform distribution from 5% to
100%. Fig. 9 shows the throughput enhancement benefits from
our reputation scheme. It can easily be concluded that at
the beginning, the throughput is less than 4000 tps due to
the low capability leader. However after about 8 epochs, the
throughput is stable around 5500 tps due to a more capable
leader being selected based on its cumulative reputation score.
We also run 20 epochs of RepChain without the reputation
scheme. That is to say, the validators is randomly sharded
into 8 groups and the leader is randomly elected. The average
throughput is 3273 tps which is similar to the first epoch
but much lower than the following epochs of RepChain
with the reputation scheme. Fig. 10 shows the relationship
between their capabilities and the reputation score in the 1st,
5th, 10th and 15th epoch. We can see the validators barely
TABLE I
COMPARISON BETWEEN REPCHAIN AND THE EXISTING WORKS.
#Nodes Resiliency Complexity Throughput Latency
Shard
Size
Balanced
Sharding
Incentive
Mechanism
Time to Fail
Elastico 1600 t<n/4 Ω(m2/b+ n) 40 tx/s 800s 100 No No 1 hour
OmniLedger 1800 t<n/4 Ω(m2/b+ n) 3500 tx/s 63s 600 No No 230 years
RapidChain 1800 t<n/3 O(m2/b+m logn) 4220 tx/s 8.5s 200
Simple -
active/inactive No 1950 years
RepChain 1800 t<n/3 O(m2/b +m) 6852 tx/s 58.2s 225
Based on
reputation Yes
Depends on attacker’s
strategy. The worst
case is the same as [8].
distinguish between each other at the first epoch. However with
more epochs, their abilities can be more easily distinguished
according to their reputation scores. Also, the relationship
between reputation scores and their capabilities is linear,
which indicates the reputation score can correctly reflect the
ability of the validators. From the results above, RepChain can
distinguish the validators with different capabilities and select
a better leader via the sharding and leader selection scheme.
Thus, our design can enhance the throughput of the sharding-
based blockchain system and incent the highly capable nodes.
F. Epoch Transition Latency
In this evaluation, we test the average epoch transition
latency of RepChain under different shard sizes of 100, 225,
300 and 450. The latency includes the time for generating state
block via collective signing, PoW, synchronization, sharding
and leader selection. The results are shown in Fig. 11 which
is 180.2s, 230.8s, 274.3s and 361.0s. Among the four stages,
the PoW and state block generation cost the most time. With
a larger shard size, the transition latency will increase due to
the overhead on collective signing.
G. Compare with other works
In this section, we compare RepChain with other works [6]–
[8]. Table. I shows that the resiliency of RepChain is the
same as RapidChain and larger than others. Our contributions
are mainly on secure, incentive mechanism and throughput
enhancement. Other works are based on random sharding or on
simple balanced sharding [8]. RepChain shards the validators
based on their reputation. As a result, the security of RepChain
depends on the attacker’s strategy. In the worst case, the time
to fail is the same as the RapidChain under the same shard
size and number of nodes. Also other works do not consider
the incentive mechanism while RepChain incents the honest
and hard-working validators. The complexity of RepChain is
O(m2/b+m) which seems the smallest. However it is worth
mentioning that other works are built on the gossip protocol
which brings complexity into the network communication. Our
system will have the same complexity if we built our system on
the gossip protocol. However, RepChain effectively utilizes the
capability of different validators and enhance the throughput
via a higher capability leader being elected.
VII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the future works of RepChain.
A. Information Dispersal Algorithms
In RepChain, the ∆ is set to be 7.5 seconds because all
the validators send the messages to each other via TCP. Such
a setting results in a relatively high latency that reduces the
system throughput. However, it can be improved by leveraging
more efficient information dispersal algorithms, such as IDA-
Gossi, an unreliable broadcast protocol with an erasure code
scheme proposed by RapidChain.
B. Permissionless Property
Permissionless is another important property for a public
blockchain, which allows anyone to participate in the system
at anytime. Such a property can be easily integrated into
RepChain as in RapidChain. More specifically, to join our
system, a new node should run a PoW on the previous state
block hashes and send its solution to one shard. The members
of that shard will review it and add it into the state block of this
epoch. Then the new node can join the system at the beginning
of the new epoch after the synchronization. In our system, the
new node has a relatively low reputation score compared with
other normal nodes who have worked for several epochs. Thus,
the join-leave attack could not threaten our system.
C. Dynamic Parameters
In the worst case of the current RepChain, an advanced
observe-act attack degrades the system security to the same
as the random-based solutions. However, we can improve it via
dynamically adjusting some system parameters. More specifi-
cally, RepChain could adjust the reputation score formula, the
sliding window and the sharding scheme dynamically based
on some randomness. Therefore, the distribution of reputation
scores would change in every epoch with some randomness,
which effectively defends the observe-act attacks
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes RepChain, a reputation-based secure,
fast, and high incentive blockchain system via sharding.
RepChain leverages reputation scores which describe the
heterogeneity among validators and provide the incentive
mechanism. RepChain is the first sharding blockchain with
double-chain architecture. For transaction chain, a Raft-based
synchronous consensus which achieves high throughput and
high resiliency has been presented. For reputation chain, the
collective signing has been utilized to achieve consensus on
the reputation score and support the high throughput trans-
action chain with a moderate generation speed. To boost the
system throughput and enhance its security, a reputation based
sharding and leader selection scheme has been proposed. To
analyze the security of RepChain, we propose a recursive
formula to calculate the epoch security within only O(km2)
time. The evaluation shows RepChain have good performance
under different threat models. And it can enhance both the
throughout and security level and provide incentive mechanism
to the existing sharding-based blockchain system.
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